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The way we experience and estimate time – subjective time – does not systematically
correspond to objective time (the physical duration of an event). Many factors can
influence subjective time and lead to mental dilation or compression of objective time.
The emotional valence of stimuli or the levels of attention or expectancy are known
to modulate subjective time even though objective time is constant. Hypnosis too is
known to alter people’s perception of time. However, it is not known whether hypnotic
time distortions are intrinsic perceptual effects, based for example on the changing
rate of an internal clock, or rather the result of a response to demand characteristics.
Here we distinguished the theories using the logic of the El Greco fallacy. When
participants initially had to compare the duration of two successive events —with
the same duration — while in “trance,” they responded that the second event was
on average longer than the first event. As both events were estimated in “trance,” if
hypnosis had impacted on an internal clock, they should have been affected to the same
extent. Conversely, when only the first event was in “trance,” there was no difference in
perceived duration. The findings conform to an El Greco fallacy effect and challenge
theories of hypnotic time distortion arguing that “trance” itself changes subjective time.
Keywords: time perception, time distortion, greco fallacy, hypnosis, suggestion
INTRODUCTION
The way we experience and estimate time – subjective time – does not systematically correspond
to objective time (the physical duration of an event). Many factors can influence subjective time
and lead to mental dilation or compression of objective time. As an illustration, the emotional
valence of stimuli (Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009) or the level of attention or expectancy (Coull
et al., 2004; Tse et al., 2004) are known to modulate subjective time even though objective time
is constant (for a review, see e.g., Grondin, 2010). Dilation leads to over-evaluation of objective
time and compression leads to under-evaluation of objective time. The fact that time perception
is so “malleable” is probably due to the fact that there is no “absolute time” ability analogous, for
instance, to absolute pitch (van Wassenhove, 2009).
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In this respect, some evidence suggests that hypnosis is able to
distort time perception (Bowers, 1979; Bowers and Brenneman,
1979; St Jean et al., 1994; Naish, 2001, 2006). More precisely,
hypnotic induction can compress time perception in the case
of what Naish (2001) calls retrospective duration judgements
(i.e., judgments made after the duration is up) (Bowers and
Brenneman, 1979; Naish, 2001), and dilate it in the case of
prospective duration judgments (i.e., the participant indicates
when she/he thinks that a specific duration is now up) (Naish,
2001, 2003). Naish (2006) proposed that the alleged hypnotic state
specifically slows down the internal clock; a putative dedicated
central mechanism underlying time perception (Creelman, 1962;
Treisman, 1963; Rammsayer and Ulrich, 2001). In this approach,
time judgments are based on an internal clock composed of a
pacemaker emitting pulses that are accumulated in a counter.
The number of counted pulses determines the length of the
perceived duration. Therefore, if hypnosis slows the internal
clock (e.g., the rate of pulses emitted by the pacemaker), time
perception should indeed be compressed (under-evaluated) in the
case of retrospective judgments (Naish, 2006). This could also
explain over-evaluation in the case of prospective judgments as
defined by Naish (2001, 2006): since the clock is running slower,
participants wait longer than objective time before reporting
that the duration is up (i.e., if 2 min seem like one, then the
participant will wait 4 min before reporting that 2 min have
passed). We will refer to this hypothesis as the Slow Clock
Theory.
Nonetheless, considering that the putative hypnotic state
distorts time perception raises a number of issues. Crucially,
current available evidence does not allow us to decide whether
hypnotic time distortions are intrinsic perceptual effects based
on “trance” itself or rather the result of expectations based on
the participants’ understanding of demand characteristics (when
participants are explicitly asked to perform temporal judgments).
In the present study, we investigated this issue using the logic
of the El Greco fallacy (Firestone, 2013; Firestone and Scholl,
2014). El Greco was an artist from the Spanish Renaissance
well known for having painted particularly elongated figures.
It has been conjectured that El Greco might have suffered
from strong astigmatism, perceptually distorting the world as if
vertically stretched out. At first glance, this might explain why
El Greco painted elongated figures; simply because he saw the
word stretched out. However, this explanation is fallacious: if
El Greco perceived the world vertically stretched out, then that
is also how he would see the canvas on which he painted his
figures. Therefore, “the real-world distortions he experienced
would never have transferred to his reproductions” (Firestone
and Scholl, 2014, p. 39). Based on this logic, Firestone and
Scholl (2014) developed a method to decide whether the effect
of different experimental conditions on perceptual decision
reflects truly perceptual effects or demand characteristics (Orne,
1959).
Here, we use the logic of the El Greco fallacy in order
to test whether the potential effects of hypnosis on time
perception are truly perceptual or not. We designed a duration
comparison task in which a standard and a target disk
presented successively on the screen had the same duration.
Participants were asked to evaluate whether the duration of
the target disk was Shorter or Longer than the standard
disk in different conditions; participants were not told that
both disks had the same duration. In one condition (Greco
Condition), participants performed the task while in “trance”
during the whole trial, in a second condition participants
were in a normal, “alert state” throughout the trial (Control
Condition) and, finally, in the third condition, participants
were in a normal “alert state” before the standard disk but
in “trance” before the target disk was displayed (Non-Greco
Condition).
In the Control Condition, participants should judge the target
disk to be Longer than the standard disk 50% of the time
(as both disks have the same duration). Similarly, during the
Greco Condition participants should also judge the target disk
to be Longer than the standard disk 50% of the time, because
participants are in “trance” both before the standard disk and the
target disk. Even if the putative Slow Clock is in operation, the
duration of both disks should be affected to the same extent, so
any bias in judgment would be analogous to a Greco fallacy effect.
Crucially, however, in the Non-Greco Condition, participants
should judge the target disk to be Shorter more often than Longer,
as compared to the standard disk (according to the Slow Clock
Theory). Participants being in “trance” before the target disk but
not before the standard disk, only the duration of the second
(target) disk should be distorted.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-one subjects (12 females, Mean Age = 24.5, SD = 4.2)
scoring 9–11 (M = 10, SD = 0.7) were recruited as
high hypnotizable subjects from a larger sample screened
with the French version of the Harvard Group Scale of
Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (Shor and Orne, 1962;
Anlló et al., in press). Each subject was paid 10€ for participation,
the whole experiment lasting approximately 1 h. Subjects had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Bayesian analyses were used to assess sensitivity. In particular,
we used Bayesian analyses to indicate the strength of evidence
for H1 versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no matter
what the stopping rule is (Rouder, 2014; Schoenbrodt et al.,
2015). Participants were recruited until the Bayes factor for post
hoc analyses following ANOVA were about >3 or <1/3. The
stopping rule undermines the meaning of frequentist statistics;
thus, interpretation will be made with respect to the Bayesian
statistics.
Written informed consents were obtained from each
participant and the experiment was conducted in a properly
ethical manner in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki
(2008). The present study was approved by the Ethics Committee
of the Université Paris Descartes (Paris 5, France).
Experimental Setup and Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a quiet experimental
room. Stimuli were delivered by a MacBook Pro, processor
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2.53 GHz, Intel Core i5. All stimuli were displayed using Matlab
(MathWorks Inc. R2009b) with the Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997).
Hypnotic Procedure
We used a 9-min induction, based on the Harvard Group Scale
of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (Shor and Orne, 1962; Anlló
et al., in press). At the end of the induction, the subject was
administered the suggestion that every time the word Trance was
displayed on the screen she would enter into hypnotic “trance,”
and every time the word Normal was displayed she would stay
or come back into a normal state of consciousness. The exact
wording of the suggestion was as follows (it was administered in
French):
When the count is finished and you are back to your normal
waking state, you will perform an experiment on the computer.
However, listen carefully to what I am going to tell you. In each
trial of the experiment, the word trance or the word normal will
be displayed on the screen. . . and each time you see the word
trance I want you to slip into the hypnotic state in which you are
now, but keeping your eyes open. Each time the word trance is
displayed, you will be as deeply hypnotized as you are now, and
you will be perfectly able to do what you are being asked to do.
Conversely, each time you see the word normal you will stay or
come back into a perfectly normal state of wakefulness. Now, by
the time I reach “five” you will open your eyes, but you will not
be fully awake. When I get to “one,” you will be fully alert, in your
normal state of wakefulness. Remember that each time you see
the word trance on the screen you will sleep into a deep trance
hypnotic state while keeping your eyes open, and each time you
see the word normal you will stay or come back into a perfectly
normal state of wakefulness.
After the suggestion, participants were asked to rate the depth
of their hypnotic “trance” during the induction procedure on a
scale from 0 (no trance) to 5 (very deep trance). In addition,
before starting the main task, the words NORMAL and TRANCE
were displayed alternately on the screen three times each, and
subjects were asked to rate the mean depth of their hypnotic
"trance" following each word on the same scale as above.
Finally, once the tasks were completed, participants received
a de-induction procedure whereby the suggestion was canceled.
A debriefing followed and concluded the experiment.
Stimuli and Experimental Design
Figure 1 shows the exact delays between the different stimuli
and their durations. Subjects were seated at about 80 cm
from the screen. In every trial, a standard black disk
(diameter = 1.2 cm/0.86◦) with a duration of 1 s, preceded
by a fixation cross (duration = 0.5 s, width and height
size = 0.5 cm/0.36◦), was first displayed at the centre of the
screen. After some delay (see below), a second identical target
disk with the same duration, still preceded by a fixation cross, was
displayed. Participants had to decide whether the duration of the
target disk was Shorter (by pressing the left arrow key) or Longer
(by pressing the right arrow key) than the first disk. Participants
were not told that both disks had the same duration.
The experiment included three experimental conditions. In
Control trials (Control Condition), the first and second disk
were preceded by the word NORMAL displayed at the centre of
the screen (duration = 3 s), in Greco trials (Greco Condition),
the first and second disk were preceded by the word TRANCE,
finally, in Non-Greco trials (Non-Greco Condition), the first disk
was preceded by the word NORMAL and the second disk was
preceded by the word TRANCE (the inter-stimulus interval (ISI)
between words and disks was 2.5 s, which includes the fixation
cross duration, namely 0.5 s).
In every trial and condition, once participants answered
the duration comparison question, the word NORMAL was
displayed at the centre of the screen, and two successive subjective
scales appeared on the screen asking participants to evaluate the
depth of their “trance” before the first disk (first scale) and before
the second disk (second scale), from 0 (no trance) to 5 (very deep
trance).
The experiment comprised two blocks: the Greco Block was
composed of Greco trials and Control trials, the Non-Greco
Block was composed of Non-Greco trials and Control trials (the
presentation of trials was randomized). There were 10 trials
for each condition; 40 trials in total. Half of participants were
presented with the Greco Block first and half of participants
performed the Non-Greco Block first (subjects were assigned to
order in an alternating way). The two blocks were necessary in
order to avoid direct comparison between trial types, especially
between Greco trials and Non-Greco trials that may have led
participants to understand how they should respond to the Greco
trials. Thus, Greco and Non-Greco trials were separately mixed
with their own Control trials (referred to as Control Greco trials
and Control Non-Greco trials, respectively).
Between the first and second block, participants were
administered a short re-induction procedure in which the
suggestion was administered again.
Statistical Analysis
We report Bayes factors, B, to assess strength of evidence for the
alternative hypothesis, H1, compared to the null hypothesis, H0
(Morey et al., 2016) for all one degree of freedom effects. A B
of 3 or above indicates “substantial evidence” for the alternative
rather than the null hypothesis, to use the term of Jeffreys
(1939) – “substantial” in the sense of evidence starting to be worth
taking note of (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013). By symmetry, a
B of 1/3 or below indicates substantial evidence for the null
rather than alternative hypothesis. Thus, a B between 3 and 1/3
indicates data insensitivity for distinguishing the alternative and
null hypotheses.
Regarding the suggestion checks carried out after the
induction phase, and also the “trance” depth ratings taken on
each trial, since a scale of 0–5 was used, the maximum difference
in ratings between the word NORMAL and the word TRANCE
could be 5. Hence, we used a uniform distribution from 0 to 5,
written BU[0,5].
According to the Slow Clock Theory (i.e., that hypnosis slows
the internal clock), the percentage of Longer responses should be
50 in the Greco condition and the percentage of Longer responses
should be lower in the Non-Greco Condition than in the Greco
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FIGURE 1 | Stimuli and delays. The figure describes the physical properties of stimuli, their duration, and the delays between them. In every trial, a first word
(NORMAL or TRANCE in the Greco Block and NORMAL in the Non-Greco Block) was displayed for 3 s at the centre of the screen. After a delay of 1 s, a fixation
cross was displayed at the centre of the screen for 0.5 s. One second after the disappearance of the cross, the standard disk (1 s) was displayed at the centre of the
screen. One second after, the second word (TRANCE or NORMAL) was displayed. Then the fixation cross and the target disk with identical delays and durations
were displayed. One second after the disappearance of the target disk, participants had to answer the duration comparison question (not shown in the figure). Once
they answered the question, the word NORMAL was displayed and then participants answered successively the two subjective scales appearing on the screen after
the word disappeared. Subjective scales asked participants to evaluate the depth of their “trance” [from 0 (no trance) to 5 (very deep trance)] before the first disk (first
scale) and before the second disk (second disk) (not shown in the figure, see main text).
Condition. In other words, the difference between the percentage
of Longer responses and the percentage of Shorter responses
should be zero in the Greco condition and should be negative in
the Non-Greco condition. Therefore, the biggest difference that
could be expected is 50% in any direction. As smaller differences
are more likely than bigger ones, we modeled the alternative
hypothesis (H1) using a normal distribution centered on zero
with a standard deviation (SD) of 25%, referred to as BN(0,25) (See
Dienes, 2014, 2015, for this notation)1. For simplicity, we used
the same H1 for every test. In addition, in cases where the Slow
Clock Theory predicts specific direction effects as in the Non-
Greco Condition (fewer Longer responses than Shorter ones) we
used a half-normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a SD of 25%,
referred to as BH(0,25).
1In order to test whether this model of the alternative hypothesis was justified, we
conducted the following calibration experiment: Naish (2001) found that hypnosis
compresses retrospective time estimations for both long periods (many minutes)
and short periods (a few seconds). In the first case, time estimations under hypnosis
were 68% of time estimations out of hypnosis; and, for the second case, the time
period more similar to ours, 81%. Therefore, we designed a comparison task where
the standard was always 1s and the target either 1s too or 0.8 s (50 trials in both
target conditions). Ten subjects (Mean Age = 30.2, SD = 4.75), answered Longer
or Shorter for every trial by means of a key press. The mean proportion of Longer
responses was 59.2 % (SD= 18.7) in the 1 s-target condition and 20.8% (SD= 15.6)
in the 0.8 s-target condition. For comparison, our model of H1 for the main
experiment assumed the rough order of scale for time distortion was to produce
longer estimates 75% of the time for subjectively lengthened intervals. In sum,
this calibration experiment justifies the values used to model the H1 (BN[0,25]) for
BFs assessing the strength of evidence when comparing the proportion of Longer
responses between the different experimental conditions.
Trance Depth Differences after the
Induction and before the First Block
Participants had to rate the depth of their hypnotic “trance”
three times: for the induction, the word TRANCE and the word
NORMAL (See Hypnotic Procedure). We conducted paired t-
tests which gave evidence that our posthypnotic suggestion had
the desired effect: The word TRANCE (M = 2.57, SD = 0.87)
produced a deeper “trance” than the word NORMAL (M = 0.42,
SD= 0.67, t20 = 10.78, p < 0.001; BU[0,5] = 6.07× 1021).
In addition, we checked to what extent the induction
(M= 3.71, SD= 0.46) produced a deeper “trance” than the words
NORMAL and TRANCE: Induction versus the word NORMAL
(t20 = 15.74, p < 0.001; BU[0,5] = 2.08 × 1052), Induction versus
the word TRANCE (t20 = 5.43, p< 0.001; BU[0,5] = 2.6× 105). In
sum, the induction produced a deeper “trance” than either word.
Trance Depth Differences between
Subjective Scales
We performed another series of paired t-tests on “trance” depth
ratings between the two subjective ratings on each trial, for
each experimental condition (Control, Greco and Non-Greco
Condition) in order to determine whether the posthypnotic
suggestion produced the changes in “trance” depth required
throughout the experiment.
For the group receiving the Greco Block first, the mean
differences between the two subjective ratings were 0.04
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(SD = 0.33) in the Control Greco Condition (t10 = 0.45,
p = 0.66; BU[0,5] = 0.04); 0.05 (SD = 0.31) in the Control Non-
Greco Condition (t10 = 0.58, p = 0.57; BU[0,5] = 0.04); 2.26
(SD = 1.00) in the Non-Greco Condition (t10 = 7.43, p < 0.001;
BU[0,5] = 6.5× 107); and 0.40 (SD= 0.39) in the Greco Condition
(t10 = 3.47, p= 0.006; BU[0,5] = 7.40).
For the group presented with the Non-Greco Block first, the
mean differences were 0.08 (SD = 0.18) in the Control Greco
Condition (t9 = 1.35, p= 0.21; BU[0,5] = 0.06); 0.03 (SD= 0.16),
in the Control Non-Greco Condition (t9 = 0.58, p = 0.57;
BU[0,5] = 0.02); 1.96 (SD = 0.76) in the Non-Greco Condition
(t9 = 8.07, p < 0.001; BU[0,5] = 1.2× 109); and 0.94 (SD = 0.62)
in the Greco Condition (t9 = 4.72, p= 0.001 ; BU[0,5] = 488.53).
In sum, analyses showed that our posthypnotic suggestion
produced the desired effect. More precisely, in the Non-Greco
Condition, the word TRANCE produced a deeper “trance” than
the word NORMAL, and in the Control Condition there were no
differences in “trance” depth between the two words NORMAL.
In the Greco Condition, the second word TRANCE produced a
slightly deeper “trance” than the first word TRANCE, but it was
small.
Effects of the Posthypnotic Suggestion
on Time Judgments
Figure 2 shows the mean percentage of Longer responses
according to condition (Control, Greco and Non-Greco types of
trials) and block order (Greco first or Non-Greco first).
In order to evaluate the effect of the different experimental
conditions (types of trials), we performed a mixed-design
ANOVA with the percentage of Longer responses as the
dependant variable, Experimental Condition (three levels: Greco,
Non-Greco and Control Condition) as the within-subjects
factor, and Block Order (Greco Block first or Non-Greco
Block First) as the between-subjects factor. Note that the level
“Control Condition” consists in the two control conditions
(the one present in the Greco Block and the one present
in the Non-Greco Block) merged together. A Bayes factor
on the percentage of Longer responses between the two
control conditions showed evidence for no difference between
them (Mean difference = 0.48%, t20 = 0.089, p = 0.930;
BN[0,25]= 0.21). Therefore, we averaged the percentage of Longer
responses over the two control conditions for every participant.
The ANOVA showed no significant main effect of the
within-subjects factor Experimental Condition (F2,38 = 0.023,
p = 0.98). There was little evidence for the main effect of
Block Order (F1,19 = 4.84, p = 0.040, BN[0,25] = 1.03).
The interaction Experimental Condition∗Block Order was not
significant (F2,38 = 2.00, p= 0.149).
Finally, we conducted single t-tests against 50% within
each group for each condition, namely six single t-tests (with
Bonferroni correction).
The Slow Clock Theory predicts that whatever the group
(Greco first or Non-Greco first) the percentage of Longer
responses should be 50% in both the Control and Greco
Conditions, and less than 50% in the Non-Greco Condition.
FIGURE 2 | Effects of the posthypnotic suggestion on time judgments. The graph shows the mean percentage of Longer responses according to
Experimental Conditions (Control, Greco and Non-Greco types of trials) and participants presented with the Greco Block first (blue) and participants presented with
the Non-Greco Block first (green). Error bars indicate 1 ± SEM.
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It is less easy to predict the pattern of responses, if driven
by demand characteristics. Presumably, this would also predict
50% of Longer responses in the Control Condition, but in
contrast to the Slow Clock Theory, the Greco Condition may
be treated similarly to the non-Greco. There are two unknown
factors here. First, it is not clear whether participants would
expect a time contraction or dilation effect, so the percentage
of Longer responses may be greater or less than 50%. Second,
we do not know how sophisticated the interpretation of demand
characteristics might be (i.e., whether the ‘trap’ in the Greco
condition is recognized). Plausibly, an appreciation of the
fallacy implicit in the Greco condition may be expected to
depend on whether the non-Greco condition had already been
experienced. Thus, an interaction with order of presentation
would be the defining feature of a demand characteristic
account. If both a slow clock and demand characteristics
were operating, then a more complex pattern of results may
emerge.
For the group presented with the Greco Block first, the mean
differences from 50% were 14.09% in the Control Condition
(t10 = 2.19, p = 0.053; BN[0,25] = 1.40); 9.09% in the Non-
Greco Condition (t10 = 1.52, p = 0.157; BN[0,25] = 0.58,
BH[0,25] = 0.13); and 20% in the Greco Condition (t10 = 4.47,
p= 0.001; BN[0,25] = 162.90).
For the group presented with the Non-Greco Block first, the
mean differences from 50% were 5% in the Control Condition
(t9 = 0.94, p = 0.37; BN[0,25] = 0.33); 8% in the Non-Greco
Condition (t9 = 1.05, p = 0.3; BN[0,25] = 0.48; BH[0,25] = 0.21);
and −3% in the Greco Condition (t9 = −0.76, p = 0.46;
BN[0,25] = 0.23).
In sum, the Non-Greco Condition provided evidence for
H0 and against hypnotic “trance” slowing the internal clock.
Conversely the Greco Condition, when it came first, provided a
demonstration of the El Greco fallacy, and hence evidence for the
operation of demand characteristics.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the nature of time distortions in
hypnosis. It has been hypothesized that hypnosis affects time
perception at the processing level in slowing down the putative
internal clock sustaining our ability to estimate time (Naish, 2001,
2003, 2006). We referred to this hypothesis as the Slow Clock
Theory. However, experimental designs used up to now to study
time estimation in hypnosis cannot tell us whether hypnotic time
distortion truly reflects alterations at a perceptual (process) level,
or pure demand characteristics. Based on the logic of the El Greco
fallacy, we designed an experiment in order to disentangle this
issue.
Under the Slow Clock Theory, the only situation in which
time distortion should have been registered was the Non-
Greco Condition. Specifically, participants should have answered
Shorter more often than Longer. Contrary to expectations,
Bayes factors indicate that, in this condition, the percentage
of Longer responses was not different from 50%. One might
argue, however, that participants were insufficiently hypnotized
to produce the timing changes. The subjective ratings in this
experiment indicated rather modest levels of hypnotic response
and there is evidence that the magnitude of the effect is
dependent upon susceptibility (see Naish, 2014, for a discussion
of the issue). Without available psychometric functions between
hypnotic depth and time distortion in the current literature, it
is nonetheless difficult to infer that our participants were not
sufficiently hypnotized to produce the timing changes. Future
studies are needed to disentangle this issue.
In addition, the Greco trials produced surprisingly contrasting
results to the above. While the Slow Clock Theory predicts
no time distortion in this condition (target and standard both
evaluated under “trance”) the participants produced responses
that did differ from the ideal 50% rate, showing that time
changes were possible with the current design. In other words,
participants exhibited an El Greco fallacy effect, although they
made more, rather than fewer, Longer judgments, as if the
putative clock had sped up between the standard and target
presentations. However, this effect was confined to the condition
in which the Greco condition was performed first.
An attempt at a partial explanation for these findings might
propose that the slowing effect produced by hypnosis takes some
time to become established. In the Non-Greco trials, the rapid
switch from “Normal” for the standard, to “Trance” for the target,
allowed insufficient time for the inner clock to slow, and as a
consequence there was no tendency to produce more Shorter
judgments. This would explain why the results for this condition
were close to 50%. For the Greco condition, the target was
presented shortly after the participant was instructed to enter a
“trance,” so the clock would still be “ticking” at close to its normal
rate. However, by the time the target was presented some slowing
would have occurred, so the target duration would appear to
differ from the standard. The problem for this account is that
the targets would seem shorter than the standards, whereas in
the data actually obtained the reverse was true. Moreover, a
‘not-yet-settled-down’ account should be equally applicable, in
whatever order the blocks were encountered; in our results the
timing disparity was apparent only when the Greco condition was
presented first. Finally, note that the “trance state” did not decay
over time (see Supplementary Figures S1 and S2) so that it cannot
be argued that participants were not in “trance” at some point
while viewing the comparison stimulus, for instance.
If a specific hypnosis-induced change is an implausible cause
of time distortion, then the alternative is that beliefs and
expectations about hypnosis (so-called demand characteristics)
were the influencing factor. This is certainly applicable across the
whole spectrum of hypnotic responding. Beliefs about hypnosis
are widespread and expectations can frequently be gleaned from
the words of the hypnotist. That this is the case was demonstrated
by Orne (1959). He reported that people of low susceptibility,
when told to act as they believe a hypnotized person would act,
are able to do so sufficiently convincingly as to deceive an expert
into believing them to be deeply hypnotized. Using ‘simulators’
in this way has become a standard means of disentangling effects
produced by demand characteristics from those that may be an
intrinsic result of hypnosis (but see Barber, 1969 for a critique
of simulators as a control group. To the extent that simulators
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are explicitly asked not to try to experience the subjective effects
associated with hypnosis, their expectations and task-demands
are rather different from non-simulators. In addition, simulators
are drawn from the population of lows for which expectations
about hypnosis are potentially different from highs’ expectations).
Mozenter and Kurtz (1992) compared highs to simulators
(and non-simulator lows) in a verbal estimation task in which
participants had to report verbally the duration of various time
intervals (30, 60, 120, and 240 s) filled with white noise. Results
are complex; for some intervals highs overestimated time and for
at least one interval simulators showed a bias but in the opposite
direction (underestimation). Overall this study is not conclusive
as to whether hypnosis affects time perception at a process level
or not, as it counts both against the Slow Clock Theory (time
underestimation) and an explanation in terms of pure demand
characteristics.
We propose that in the present study, participants answered
both according to their beliefs about the way hypnosis
affects time perception and with respect to the experimental
manipulations in force. During post-experimental debriefing,
we asked participants how they thought hypnosis affected time
perception. Eighty percent (17 out 21) replied that hypnosis
slows time. When asked to clarify the statement, they said that a
stimulus of a certain duration would appear retrospectively longer
if time were slowed down. This is exactly the effect observed
in the data, so it can be argued that these participants were
indeed producing the effects that they believed to be applicable
to hypnosis. Against this interpretation, it might be argued that
participants truly experienced some time distortion and then
later, when asked, report holding a belief consistent with their
experience. The existence of time distortions is not something
that is nonetheless evident from the experience itself. Further,
participants did not experience time distortions in the current
experiment; as shown by the absence of a time distortion effect in
the Non-Greco Condition. In order to strengthen the claim that
participants followed their beliefs about the way hypnosis affects
time perception in reporting their time judgments under the
different conditions, future research could obtain belief reports
prior to the task or explicitly manipulate pre-task beliefs about
time perception during hypnosis (through informing participants
that hypnosis speeds up or slows down the subjective experience
of time), or, again, ask an independent group of subjects.2
2 For converging evidence, we asked an independent group of subjects (unselected
for hypnotisability) the following, by means of a short online survey: “Intuitively,
do you think that hypnosis slows down of speeds up time perception? For
instance, suppose that I display to you a sound for 5 s and then that I ask you
to evaluate its duration once it is up. If hypnotized, do you think you would
evaluate the sound as shorter or longer than it really is? (translated from the
French version given to participants).” Seventy-six percent of subjects (N = 17, 9
females, Mean Age= 33.5; SD= 5.7) said they would evaluate the sound as longer.
This result is in line with our post-experimental debriefing, consistent with the
conjecture that a common pre-existing belief is that hypnotic trance would make
intervals seem longer.
Two questions remain unanswered: why the effect discussed
above occurred only when the El Greco block was encountered
first, and why no effect was observed in the Non-Greco block.
A possible explanation concerns the nature of the Non-Greco
block. It was a relatively complex condition, and the switching
in and out of a resource-demanding task (i.e., responding to
the hypnotic suggestion, Wyzenbeek and Bryant, 2012) may
have made it harder for participants to recognize what might
be expected of them. Nevertheless, having experienced this task
first may have left participants sufficiently well informed that,
when they encountered the El Greco block they recognized the
illogicality of making Longer judgements when the standard had
also been viewed in hypnosis.
In sum, we found changes in time perception concomitant
with hypnotic “trance” consistent with demand characteristics
but not with a putative change in the internal clock brought about
by trance. “Trance” may well be experienced in a compelling way;
but it may have the felt qualities simply that participants expect
of it.
A general consideration for all time perception research is
therefore the extent to which estimates of time may be based
on a time-specific mechanism like an accumulator, or rather on
expectations determined by demand characteristics. In general,
the results indicate that research into time perception may easily
fall foul of demand characteristics when trying to characterize
domain-specific mechanisms.
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